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“THAT’S WHAT SHE SAID”: AN EVALUATION OF 
WHETHER HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
IN ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS 
Andrea Laterza* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An accusatory instrument is a criminal complaint that charges 
a defendant with a crime.1  The complaining witness usually attests to 
the incident by signing a supporting deposition, a firsthand narrative 
of the crime, which is attached to the accusatory instrument.2  In some 
instances where the complainant chooses not to sign a supporting 
deposition, Assistant District Attorneys (hereinafter “ADA”) and 
police officers, who were not present during the incident, sign 
supporting depositions in lieu of the complainant’s supporting 
deposition.3  The ADA and officer’s supporting depositions in those 
cases, however, are hearsay because they are not based on personal 
knowledge, but are instead based on information relayed to them 
 
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Hofstra 
University, B.A., cum laude, Psychology.  I would like to thank the Nassau County Legal Aid 
Society for bringing this topic to my attention.  I would also like to thank Rhona Amorado and 
Professor Michelle Zakarin, Esq. for their advice and hard work throughout the editing 
process. 
1 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15 (McKinney 1978) (“The accusatory part of each such 
instrument must designate the offense or offenses charged.”).  
2 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.20 (McKinney 1972) (“A supporting deposition is a written 
instrument accompanying or filed in connection with an information, a simplified information, 
a misdemeanor complaint or a felony complaint, subscribed and verified by a person other 
than the complainant of such accusatory instrument, and containing factual allegations of an 
evidentiary character, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, 
which supplement those of the accusatory instrument and support or tend to support the charge 
or charges contained therein.”). 
3 See People v. Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002); People 
v. Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d 567, 572 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cty. 2002); People v. Swinger, 689 
N.Y.S.2d 336, 341 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1998). 
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through the complainant.4  New York’s Criminal Procedure Law 
(hereinafter “CPL”) states that accusatory instruments must not 
contain any hearsay allegations,5 or the claims they allege will be 
dismissed for facial insufficiency.6  Despite the obvious violation of 
the hearsay rule, New York trial courts have found these accusatory 
instruments to be facially sufficient based on hearsay exceptions, such 
as excited utterances and present sense impressions.7   
In People v. Solomon,8 a police officer and an ADA each filed 
supporting depositions stating the complaining witness told the officer, 
“while speaking loudly and talking fast,” that the defendant hit her.9  
The Kings County Criminal Court held that this behavior constituted 
an excited utterance10 because the statement was made shortly after the 
incident while the complainant was still visibly upset.11  The court 
permitted the use of the accusatory instrument, holding that the excited 
utterance hearsay exception is applicable to the affidavits.12  Thus, the 
court found that the accusatory instrument, which did not contain a 
deposition from the actual victim, was facially sufficient even though 
it contained only hearsay allegations.13  In order to justify its position, 
 
4 See People v. Giarraputo, 949 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (Crim. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 2012) 
(defining hearsay as “testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows 
personally, but what others have said and is therefore dependent on the credibility of someone 
other than the witness.”) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)). 
5 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972) (“An information, or a count 
thereof, is sufficient on its face when . . . [n]on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the 
information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the 
offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.”). 
6 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35(1)(a) (McKinney 1972) (“An information, a simplified 
information, a prosecutor’s information or a misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is 
defective within the meaning of paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 170.30 when: (a) 
It is not sufficient on its face pursuant to the requirements of section 100.40.”). 
7 See People v. Valentine, 2011 WL 5007959 at *4 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2011) (“[A]n 
excited utterance made by a complaint to a police officer/deponent, may serve in lieu of a 
supporting deposition, as the vehicle by which to convert a complaint into an information.”). 
8 2002 WL 32157170 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002). 
9 Id. at *1. 
10 Id. at *3 (“[A]n excited utterance is a spontaneous declaration, made contemporaneously 
or immediately after a startling event, which asserts the circumstances of that occasion as 
observed by the declarant.”); see discussion infra Section III. 
11 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *4. 
12 Id. at *3; see also People v. Vickers, 2007 WL 2982004, at *4 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 
2007) (“[T]he complainant’s statements to Officer Beierle constitute excited utterances.  As 
such, they can be used in lieu of a supporting deposition to convert the docket to an 
information.”). 
13 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3. 
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the court cited to People v. Foster14 and People v. Swinger.15  In both 
of those cases, the trial court held that the accusatory instrument was 
facially sufficient based on excited utterances.16  The court reasoned, 
where hearsay exceptions would be permitted at trial, they should also 
be permitted in the accusatory instrument because there is a lower 
standard of proof in determining the viability of an accusatory 
instrument, as opposed to the state’s trial burden.17  The Solomon 
court’s holding, as well as the other courts’ holdings, disregards the 
statutory requirements of the CPL.18   
A recent decision in Nassau County, People v. Rasoully,19 
addressed the issue of whether a supporting deposition, containing 
only hearsay exceptions, may serve as a basis to corroborate the 
complaint.20  In this case, an ADA and the responding officer each 
signed a supporting deposition because the alleged victim refused to 
sign one.21  The ADA’s deposition recounted the 911 call allegedly 
made by the victim.22  The prosecution argued that the contents of the 
call constituted an excited utterance and a present sense impression, 
which should be permitted in the accusatory instrument based on the 
holding in Solomon.23  The court, however, rejected the prosecution’s 
argument, and recognized that the ADA’s deposition, which contained 
a third-party’s description of recording, lacked authentication and was 
based entirely on inadmissible hearsay.24  While the court did not 
permit the ADA’s supporting deposition, it found that the officer’s 
deposition was based not upon hearsay, but upon factual, personal 
knowledge.25  The court found that the accusatory instrument was 
facially sufficient because the officer stated in his deposition that he 
 
14 740 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002); see discussion infra Section III. 
15 689 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1998); see discussion infra Section III. 
16 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3. 
17 Id. at *2. 
18 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972) (“An information, or a count 
thereof, is sufficient on its face when . . . [n]on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the 
information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the 
offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.”). 
19 People v. Rasoully, 2016 WL 4767430 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016). 
20 Id. at *1. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at *2. 
23 Id. 
24 Rasoully, 2016 WL 4767430 at *2. 
25 Id. at *3. 
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observed an upset woman with an injury on her face and the defendant 
admitted to him that he hit her.26       
In contrast to Rasoully, another Nassau County decision, 
People v. Rizzo,27 not only rejected hearsay in the accusatory 
instrument but also held that “details relayed through [an] [o]fficer [] 
are not properly considered in ruling on the sufficiency of the 
accusatory instrument.”28  The court reasoned that hearsay exceptions, 
alone, could never make an accusatory instrument facially sufficient 
because, besides the hearsay, the accusatory instrument lacks “any 
meaningful facts.”29  
The issue of whether hearsay exceptions in an accusatory 
instrument may serve as a valid replacement for a complainant’s 
supporting deposition has not yet gone to an appellate court in New 
York.30  This Note argues that hearsay exceptions, specifically excited 
utterances and present sense impressions, should not be permitted to 
corroborate a complaint in lieu of a complaining witness’s supporting 
deposition because it is a clear violation of the CPL,31 and constitutes 
unfair prosecution, in that a defendant may be charged based solely on 
hearsay exceptions, instead of concrete facts.32   
This Note will be divided into six sections.  Section II will 
examine accusatory instruments and their function.  Section III will 
discuss hearsay, the hearsay exceptions used by the District Attorney’s 
Office in accusatory instruments, and the reliability33 of these hearsay 
 
26 Id. at *2-3 (“[T]he allegations of Officer Re, which are based upon his first-hand 
observations and personal knowledge, contain sufficient non-hearsay allegations which 
‘establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission 
thereof.’”) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1) (McKinney 1972)). 
27 735 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2001). 
28 Id. at 919. 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
30 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3. 
31 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1978) (“The factual part of [an 
accusatory] instrument must contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an 
evidentiary character . . . supported by non-hearsay allegations.”). 
32 See infra notes 48, 68, 71 and accompanying text. 
33 See generally Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 485 (1999); Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited 
Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, (1997); Stanley A. Goldman, 
Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a “Firmly Rooted”‘ Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453 (1990).  See also Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to 
Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 95 (1987) (arguing that evidence stemming from an 
officer is inherently unreliable due to the police’s natural animosity toward criminal 
defendants). 
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exceptions.  Section IV will analyze the Confrontation Clause and will 
address whether hearsay in an accusatory instrument violates a 
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront “the 
witnesses against him.”34  Specifically, this section argues that the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment should extend to the 
pleading stage because there is a strong probability that these cases 
may never go to trial.35  In addition, this section will address whether 
the accused can confront his or her accuser if the complaining witness 
never comes forward and he or she is prosecuted based entirely on 
hearsay.  Section V will discuss how defense attorneys should handle 
these types of cases, specifically that they need to address the pleading 
defect in a motion or on the record.  This section will also propose a 
solution to the court, mainly that hearsay exceptions should only be 
permitted in accusatory instruments if there is sufficient corroborating 
evidence and if the witness is unavailable.  Also, this section will 
suggest that non-testifying hearsay declarants should be able to be 
impeached by prior inconsistent statements.  Lastly, Section VI will 
summarize why permitting hearsay in accusatory instruments should 
not be permitted.  
II.  ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS 
The purpose of an accusatory instrument is to “provide a 
defendant with fair notice of the charges against him or her, and of the 
manner, time, and place of the conduct underlying the accusations 
. . . .”36  This notice gives the defendant the opportunity to prepare his 
or her defense.37   
There are two parts to an accusatory instrument, the accusatory 
part and the factual part.38  The accusatory part must state the crime 
with which the defendant is being charged.39  The factual part must 
allege “facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to 
support the charges.”40   
 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
35 See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES 
(March 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-
rulings-on-plea-deals.html (“94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains.”). 
36 People v. Atta, 5 N.Y.S.3d 455, 457 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015). 
37 Id. 
38 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15 (McKinney 1978). 
39 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(2) (McKinney 1978). 
40 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1978). 
5
Laterza: Hearsay Exceptions in Accusatory Instruments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1222 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
A. Requirements for Facial Sufficiency 
An accusatory instrument is insufficient if it contains only 
hearsay allegations in establishing any and all elements of the offense 
charged.41  The accusatory instrument must be dismissed if it is 
uncertain whether it is based upon hearsay or direct knowledge.42  The 
“required non-hearsay evidentiary allegations [must be] within ‘the 
four corners of the instrument itself.’”43  When a witness’s deposition 
is based on what someone else told him instead of being based on what 
he or she witnessed, the information stems entirely from hearsay, 
which renders it defective.44  The New York Court of Appeals has 
repeatedly held that conclusory allegations, such as drawing inferences 
from hearsay, will not suffice as a substitute for evidentiary facts.45  
Hearsay is explicitly prohibited in accusatory instruments;46 therefore, 
it is inexcusable for any court to permit hearsay allegations in place of 
“facts of an evidentiary character.”47 
B. Legislative Intent 
The CPL requires factual evidence and forbids hearsay in the 
accusatory instrument because, without those safeguards, the People 
could prosecute anyone based on unfounded and groundless 
allegations.48  The requirements for the factual portion of the 
accusatory instrument are strict and straightforward.49  The reason for 
requiring factual proof is evident when understanding the function of 
an accusatory instrument as laid out in the CPL.50  The prosecution 
must make out a prima facie case in the information, the formal written 
 
41 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
100.15(3) (McKinney 1978); People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71, 72 (N.Y. 1987).   
42 People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 237 (N.Y. 2000) (“[B]ecause it cannot be determined 
upon the face of the information whether the pleading is in compliance with [the non-hearsay 
requirement of the CPL], the information is subject to a motion to dismiss.”). 
43 People v. Thomas, 824 N.E.2d 499, 501 (N.Y. 2005) (quoting Preiser, Practice 
Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A).  
44 People v. Krimitsos, 831 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2006).   
45 People v. Dreyden, 931 N.E.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. 2010), People v. Dumas, 497 N.E.2d 686, 
686-87 (N.Y. 1986). 
46 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972). 
47 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1978). 
48 People v. Monero, 712 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2000). 
49 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15 (McKinney 1978) (stating the requirements for the 
factual portion of the accusatory instrument). 
50 Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d at 73. 
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accusation charging a defendant with a crime, because it is the sole 
instrument needed to prosecute someone for a misdemeanor.51  Thus, 
aside from the misdemeanor complaint, the prosecution does not need 
to present any other factual evidence before trial, if the case even goes 
to trial.52   
The non-hearsay “requirement is not merely a formalistic 
technicality,” but is rooted in “fairness and due process.”53  Every 
defendant has the right to be prosecuted by a valid information 
regardless of how heinous the charges against him or her are.54  It is 
vital for the actual victim to sign a supporting deposition because it 
shows “that a real person actually complained to the police and had an 
opportunity to review the accuracy of the factual allegations drafted by 
the prosecutor.”55  The legislators foresaw this potential abuse of 
prosecutorial power, which is why they created the non-hearsay 
requirement.56  In order to avoid the slippery slope of baseless 
prosecutions, it is crucial to forbid hearsay allegations in accusatory 
instruments.57 
In In re Neftali D.,58 the New York Court of Appeals compared 
the requirements for an accusatory instrument to the requirements for 
a juvenile delinquency petition under the Family Court Act.59  The 
court stated, “The sufficiency requirements . . . are not simply 
technical pleading requirements but are designed to ensure substantive 
due process protection.”60  The court reasoned that a juvenile 
delinquency petition, like an accusatory instrument, is the sole 
instrument for which someone could be “arrested and deprived of 
liberty.”61  Thus, it is of utmost importance that both documents 
 
51 Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d at 73 (stating that a misdemeanor complaint differs from a felony 
complaint in that the felony complaint would be “followed by preliminary hearing and a Grand 
Jury proceeding”). 
52 Id. at 73-74; see Goode, supra note 35 (stating that only approximately 6% of state 
criminal cases actually go to trial because the majority of criminal defendants will take a plea 
deal). 
53 People v. Phillipe, 538 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403-04 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1989). 
54 Rizzo, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 918. 
55 Phillipe, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 404. 
56 See Monero, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 764 (“CPL [§] 100.15 and [§] 100.40 require the People to 
file an accusatory instrument based on nonhearsay evidence. The purpose of this requirement 
is to prevent the People from bringing baseless prosecutions.”). 
57 Id. 
58 651 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1995). 
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comply with statutory requirements.62  The New York Court of 
Appeals recognized the dangers of statutory non-compliance.63  If 
prosecutors neglect to follow the CPL, there could be chaos in the 
number of people arrested and prosecuted based on unreliable hearsay 
rather than solid factual allegations.64  Thus, hearsay exceptions should 
never be permitted in accusatory instruments. 
III. HEARSAY 
Hearsay is “an out-of-court65 statement66 offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted67 therein.”68  The rule against hearsay was 
created out of “[d]istrust of jurors and their ability to appropriately 
weigh the credibility of a witness’s trial testimony recounting someone 
else’s statement.”69   
The United States Supreme Court recognized three reasons for 
excluding hearsay.70  First, the Court reasoned that the witness must 
physically take the stand under oath in order to understand the 
seriousness of his statements.71  If a witness falsely testified as to 
someone else’s knowledge, it would be difficult for the prosecution to 
bring forth perjury charges.72  Second, the witness has to be present in 
order to be cross-examined, which is the most effective method for 
assessing truth.73  Cross-examination measures credibility by 
“explor[ing] weaknesses in a declarant’s memory, perception, 
 
62 Id. 
63 In re Neftali D., 651 N.E.2d at 871-72. 
64 See id. (holding that a juvenile delinquency petition, like an accusatory instrument, must 
comport with statutory requirements because it is the sole instrument needed to arrest someone 
and deprive him of his liberty); See also People v. Zambounis, 167 N.E. 183, 184 (N.Y. 1929) 
(“Forms and procedure still have their place and purpose in the administration of the law; 
without them we would have chaos.”). 
65 An out-of-court statement is one that “the declarant does not make while testifying at the 
current trial or hearing.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(1). 
66 A statement is “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct” so long 
as the person intended to communicate something. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
67 An out-of-court statement will only be hearsay if it is offered “to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
68 Stern v. Waldbaum, 651 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1996). 
69 Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against 
Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 717, 718 (2015). 
70 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). 
71 Id. 
72 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913). 
73 California, 399 U.S. at 158. 
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narrative ability, and sincerity.”74  The Court, lastly, recognized that 
hearsay must be excluded because it is crucial for the jury to observe 
the witness’s demeanor on the stand in order to evaluate his or her 
credibility.75  Thus, for the reasons outlined by the Supreme Court, 
hearsay is impermissible as evidence.76  
A. Hearsay Exceptions 
Although hearsay is impermissible as evidence, several hearsay 
exceptions were developed because “some out-of-court statements 
were thought to contain sufficient indicia of reliability to deem them 
worthy of admission into evidence.”77  In order for an out-of-court 
statement to be admitted into evidence, it must not only fall within a 
hearsay exception but also be proven to be reliable by the 
prosecution.78  The Federal Rules of Evidence outlines thirty-two 
exceptions and exclusions to the hearsay rule.79  These exceptions stem 
from necessity80 and were created for jury trials.81  The two relevant 
hearsay exceptions that will be addressed in this Note are the present 
sense impression and the excited utterance.82   
1. Present Sense Impression 
The present sense impression allows the trier of fact to hear 
hearsay testimony of “[a] statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived 
it.”83  A statement made while or immediately after an event occurred 
is theoretically reliable because the statement and the event take place 
 
74 Park, supra note 33, at 55. 
75 California, 399 U.S. at 158. 
76 Id. 
77 Williams, supra note 69, at 720. 
78 People v. Brensic, 509 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (N.Y. 1987). 
79 FED. R. EVID. 801-804.  New York has not codified its own rules of evidence, but 
acknowledges both the excited utterance and the present sense impression as exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.  See People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. 1993) (recognizing the present 
sense impression as a New York hearsay exception); see People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 
1231 (N.Y. 1979) (recognizing the excited utterance hearsay exception). 
80 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968). 
81 See Williams, supra note 69, at 728. 
82 FED. R. EVID. 803. 
83 FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
9
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at practically the same time, leaving no time for reflection.84  An 
example of a present sense impression would be a neighbor calling the 
police to report a break-in across the street while describing the 
burglar’s appearance and actions.85  In People v. Brown,86 the New 
York Court of Appeals held that present sense impressions may be 
admissible as long as the declarant’s statements were sufficiently 
corroborated.87  However, the court did not definitively state how 
much corroboration would be required.88  In this particular case, the 
court decided the police’s arrival at the scene shortly thereafter was 
sufficient corroboration because the officers observed the people and 
the atmosphere described by the neighbor.89 
2. Excited Utterance 
An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling 
event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement that it caused.”90  The exception may be admissible if: “(1) 
the statement was made contemporaneously or immediately after a 
startling or upsetting event; [and] (2) the declarant was under the stress 
of excitement, or shock, or trauma at the time the utterance was made, 
and before the declarant had the opportunity to reflect and fabricate.”91  
Excited utterances are admissible under the theory that “the excitement 
flows from the event,” thereby making the utterance part of the event 
itself.92   
In assessing whether a statement should be admitted as an 
excited utterance, the court factors “the nature of the event, the amount 
of time which elapsed between the occurrence and the statement, and 
 
84 People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 371-72 (N.Y. 1993). 
85 See id. at 371. 
86 610 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a 911 call describing a burglary, including the 
perpetrators’ descriptions and actions was admitted into evidence as present sense impression).  
87 Id. at 374. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
91 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1998) (citing People v. Vasquez, 
670 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1996), People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1987), People v. 
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109 (N.Y. 1986), People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 
1979), People v. Simms, 665 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1997), People v. Van Patten, 
509 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1986), People v. Egan, 434 N.Y.S.2d 55 (App. Div. 
4th Dep’t 1980)). 
92 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 168–69. 
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the activities of the declarant in the interim to ascertain if there was 
significant opportunity to deviate from the truth.”93   
In Swinger, the responding officer arrived within one minute of 
receiving the 911 call while “the dispute was still in progress.”94  The 
officer heard a verbal altercation and witnessed the complainant crying 
while hiding on the floor behind the couch.95  She had bruises on her 
face and told the officer in a distressed tone that her husband beat her.96  
The woman later recanted her statement and refused to press charges 
against her husband.97  Nevertheless, the court held that the woman’s 
statement to the officer was an excited utterance and permitted it in the 
accusatory instrument as an exception to the hearsay rule.98  The court 
reasoned that the victim in this case was a battered woman who was 
traumatically beaten by her husband.99  The officer arrived in the 
middle of the event while the woman was “cowering in fear.”100  The 
court concluded that the statement qualified as an excited utterance 
because “the statement was made spontaneously, under the stress of a 
startling event,” thereby leaving no time for reflection or fabrication.101 
Similarly, in Foster, the officer arrived at the scene within five 
minutes of receiving the 911 call.102  The complainant, while “sweating 
and in an excited state,” asserted that he was stabbed in the head with 
a screwdriver by the defendant.103  The court reasoned that the 
complainant’s statement to the officer constituted an excited utterance 
because “[a] gash to the head caused by being stabbed in the head by 
a hard sharp metal object such as a screwdriver is an injury that would 
be startling and upsetting to any reasonable person.”104   
On the contrary, in People v. Heinitz,105 the officer arrived 
within five minutes of receiving the 911 call and observed the victim 
 
93 People v. Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997) (citing People v. 
Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1987); 
People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109 (N.Y. 1986)). 
94 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 341. 
99 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 571. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 People v. Heinitz, 859 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2008). 
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crying while touching her crooked nose, which had a dark mark on 
it.106  The victim stated that the defendant head-butted her.107  The court 
held this statement did not qualify as an excited utterance because, 
although the victim was crying and sniffling, she was “not yelling, 
screaming, or visibly disturbed in any other way.”108  The court 
reasoned, “[w]hen the injuries suffered by a complainant are 
considerably less severe, as is the case here, the complainant’s reaction 
and emotional and physical states must be proportionately higher in 
order to meet the threshold of an excited utterance standard.”109  The 
complainant in this case kept touching her nose and asking the officer 
if it was broken.110  The court reasoned that “the fact that the 
complainant was ‘aware of her injury’ . . . belies the reasoning behind, 
and the need for, the excited utterance doctrine.”111  The court 
concluded that if a declarant is having rational thoughts she could not 
possibly be in a traumatic enough state to declare an excited 
utterance.112 
Courts have differed on the standard for what should constitute 
an excited utterance.113  Some courts focus on the amount of time 
elapsed between receiving the 911 call and an officer arriving on the 
scene.114  Other courts focus on the state of mind of the victim and the 
severity of his or her injuries.115  Overall, the test for whether a 
statement qualifies as an excited utterance is subjective.116  A judge 
does not have the medical training to understand whether an injury or 
 
106 Id. at 2. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 3; Cf. People v. Mitchell, 849 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007) 
(holding that the complainant’s statements were excited utterances because she was 
“screaming,” “hysterical,” and “gasping for air”). 
109 Heinitz, 2008 WL 756131 at *3. 
110 Id. at *2. 
111 Id. at *3. 
112 Id. 
113 Compare Heinitz, 859 N.Y.S.2d 905 (considering “the surrounding facts and 
circumstances, the additional information in the second superseding instrument, the 
complainant’s appearance, the severity of her injuries, the amount of time elapsed since the 
incident, and the content of the statement itself”), with Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d 567, 571 
(considering only whether the declarant was under the stress of the startling event when she 
spoke). 
114 See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (holding that the exception should apply if there is a 
one-minute elapse of time); see Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (holding that the exception should 
only apply if the elapse of time is within five minutes). 
115 See Heinitz, 859 N.Y.S.2d 905; see Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 571. 
116 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
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situation is traumatic enough to bring about an excited utterance or 
whether a victim’s reaction to being injured is an appropriate response.  
The judge’s perception of the incident may not be accurate, yet he or 
she has broad discretion in choosing whether to admit the statement.117  
Thus, excited utterances should never be permitted in accusatory 
instruments as the sole form of evidence against someone. 
B. DA’s Rationale for Using Hearsay Exceptions in 
Accusatory Instruments 
Although hearsay is not permitted in accusatory instruments, 
prosecutors have offered several justifications for using hearsay 
exceptions.118  First, prosecutors have argued that hearsay exceptions 
are permitted at trial, where the standard of proof is higher than at the 
pleading stage.119  Thus, the exceptions should be permitted in the 
accusatory instrument because there is a lower threshold of proof.120  
The problem with the DA’s reasoning is there is a ninety percent 
chance the case will not go to trial.121  If the case never goes to trial, 
then the defendant would be prosecuted based on a statement that may 
not be accurate and cannot be challenged through trial proceedings, 
such as cross-examination.122  Second, prosecutors have argued that 
they should be able to use hearsay exceptions in accusatory 
instruments because other courts have permitted them.123  Other states 
also permit hearsay exceptions at trial regardless of the availability of 
 
117 See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. 
118 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972). 
119 People v. Fields, 344 N.Y.S.2d 413, 416 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1973) (“[Hearsay] 
exceptions must be authorized implicitly in the Criminal Procedure Law or we have the absurd 
result that the rules for making an information are more stringent than those applicable to 
criminal trials and hearings.  In the light of the historical case background and the absurdity 
of any other construction, we must construe Hearsay as used in the Criminal Procedure Law 
to mean hearsay which is not admissible on the trial.”). 
120 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *2. 
121 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1997). 
122 See Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New 
York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 179 (2002) 
(stating that in cases where hearsay is admitted as the sole form of evidence, defendants have 
“little or no opportunity to cross-examine the complainant, the heart of the prosecution’s case.  
The majority of domestic violence trials involve ‘what happened’ defenses, which may depend 
largely on the strength of the complainant’s credibility against assertions of grudges, self-
interests, jealousies, and other biases or motives for fabrication.”). 
123 See Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3; Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 572; Swinger, 689 
N.Y.S.2d at 341. 
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the declarant.124  Lastly, prosecutors have justified the use of hearsay 
exceptions because sometimes hearsay is the only evidence in a 
case.125  
C. Reliability of Excited Utterances and Present Sense 
Impressions 
Hearsay exceptions will only be admitted if they are proven to 
be reliable.126  Reliability is the sum of the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement that render the declarant worthy of 
belief.127  After taking all of the surrounding circumstances into 
consideration, the statement, made under those surrounding 
conditions, should appear to be highly truthful.128  The time frame as 
to when the statement was made is an important factor in a court’s 
analysis.129  Most courts have deemed statements made only a few 
minutes after the incident as reliable.130  Their reasoning is that if the 
statement was made quickly, it was spontaneous and leaves little time 
for fabrication.131  However, some courts have permitted excited 
utterances that were made up to two and a half hours after the 
 
124 King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (statements to girlfriend 
confessing to murder were admitted as an excited utterance); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App. 
3d 1383, 1387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (declarant present at trial but did not testify); People v. 
Jones, 155 Cal. App. 3d 653, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (statements by murder victim were 
admitted as hearsay exceptions).  
125 Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the 
Challenge Of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1993) 
(discussing how hearsay exceptions may be the only form of evidence in a child abuse case 
where the child may not take the stand because it is too traumatic). 
126 Brensic, 509 N.E.2d at 1228. 
127 Nucci v. Proper, 744 N.E.2d 128, 131 (N.Y. 2001) (“Relevant factors include 
‘spontaneity, repetition, the mental state of the declarant, absence of motive to fabricate, 
unlikelihood of faulty recollection and the degree to which the statement was against the 
declarant’s . . . interest.’ Courts have also ‘considered the status or relationship to the declarant 
of the person to whom the statement was made . . ., whether there was a coercive atmosphere, 
whether it was made in response to questioning and whether the statements reflect an attempt 
to shift blame or curry favor.’”) (quoting People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 1066 (N.Y. 
1999)).  
128 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *2. 
129 See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 338; see Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 568. 
130 See id. 
131 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341; Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 572. 
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incident.132  This line of reasoning directly contradicts the 
“spontaneity” requirement.133   
In People v. Cotto,134 the victim, while in an ambulance after 
being shot, named Richie Cotto as his shooter.135  Although there was 
a gap in time and the declaration was in response to probing questions, 
the New York Court of Appeals held that the statement was admissible 
as an excited utterance.136  The court reasoned that “[w]hile it is critical 
that statements be made before a declarant had an opportunity to 
reflect, the relevant time period ‘is not measured in minutes or 
seconds’ but rather ‘is measured by facts.’”137  The court decided that 
the victim’s “shock and trauma never subsided,” which eliminated his 
ability to reflect, thereby rendering his statements reliable.138  Contrary 
to the majority’s reasoning, the victim was not in shock, but was 
“conscious and lucid.”139  The victim also clearly did not make any 
spontaneous declarations.140  Instead, he intentionally declined to name 
his shooter and only mentioned Richie after continuous probing and 
prodding by both the officer and the emergency medical technician, 
who told him that he was probably going to die.141  A statement that 
was “made in response to suggestive comments and questioning . . . 
lack[s] the inherent reliability of an excited utterance.”142  While a 
gunshot wound is certainly traumatic, “there is no presumption that a 
statement” made after such an event necessarily qualifies as an excited 
utterance.143  The victim “reflected upon his answers, deliberated 
before responding, and weighed his responses accordingly,” which 
demonstrates that he was not in an excited state.144 
 
132 People v. Brooks, 522 N.E.2d 1051, 1051 (N.Y. 1988); see also Brown, 517 N.E.2d at 
515 (holding that a statement made 30 minutes after the incident is sufficient in time to permit 
the hearsay exception). 
133 Nucci, 744 N.E.2d at 131. 
134 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998). 
135 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 400. 
137 Id. at 399 (quoting Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d at 1328). 
138 Id. at 400. 
139 Id. at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
140 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
141 Id. 
142 People v. Fenner, 727 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001); see also Elizabeth 
F. Lofus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 48, 518-37 (1993) 
(describing how “new, postevent information often becomes incorporated into memory, 
supplementing and altering a person’s recollection.”). 
143 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 406 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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Even if an excited utterance was made shortly after the 
incident, that still does not mean it was reliable.145  A person could 
craft a lie in merely two seconds.146  In addition, the accepted short 
time period does not necessarily comport with the psychology of a 
victim.147  Many victims feel ashamed and tend to withdraw.148  Thus, 
it is unlikely for a victim to immediately come forward with an 
accurate tale as to what happened.149  Further, the short time frame is 
also unreliable because victims may initially suppress unwanted or 
unpleasant memories, which may not return to their consciousness 
until a later time.150   
The excited utterance doctrine focuses on the sincerity of the 
statement, but does not factor into account any mistakes based on 
perception and memory.151  The complex cognitive processes that 
occur in the brain play tricks on one’s senses, especially vision and 
hearing.152  Perception and memory are matters of “reconstruction” 
rather than a playback of what actually occurred.153  Thus, it is 
incredibly plausible and common for people to make honest errors 
about what they saw or heard.154  In addition, “entire events that never 
happened can be injected into memory.”155  Psychology experiments 
have shown that people can make up false memories of witnessing an 
 
145 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 179. 
146 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 178 (citing Goldman, supra note 33, at 460 (“[T]he hearsay 
statement would have to be spoken virtually simultaneously with the described event for even 
the slightest assurance of increased reliability.”)). 
147 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 180. 
148 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 204. 
149 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 204; see also Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five 
Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
981, 1033-34 (2008) (discussing how New York does not have a statute of limitations for rape 
because the legislators understand that many victims take time to come forward). 
150 Lofus, supra note 142, at 518-37. 
151 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 179. 
152 See Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Failure to Detect Changes to People During a 
Real-World Interaction, PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW 5(4), 644 (1998) (describing 
“change blindness,” a phenomenon in which observers fail to notice substantial changes 
happening right in front of their eyes).  
153 Brady Wagoner, Barlett’s Concept of Schema in Reconstruction, THEORY & 
PSYCHOLOGY 23(5), 562 (2013). 
154 Id. at 562. 
155 Lofus, supra note 142, at 518-37 (1993) (describing “the case of Paul Ingram,” who was 
falsely accused of participating “in a Satan-worshipping cult alleged to have murdered 25 
babies.”  Ingram, who was completely innocent, was pressed to remember what he had done 
and “developed detailed memories and wrote a three-page statement confessing in graphic 
detail” to a crime he never committed).  
16
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assault.156  For this reason, hearsay exceptions should never be 
permitted in accusatory instruments because the witness could simply 
be mistaken about what he heard or saw.157   
Furthermore, psychological scholars do not condone the 
concept that the stress of an event will produce an accurate account of 
the incident.158  To be sure, the extreme stress and strong feelings 
evoked by such an event will heavily interfere with one’s perception 
and memory.159  Therefore, excited utterances and present sense 
impressions are inherently unreliable and should not be used in 
accusatory instruments. 
D. Credibility of Hearsay Declarants 
When choosing to admit a hearsay exception into evidence, 
courts do not consider the credibility of the hearsay declarant.160  
Instead, courts use a “trauma trumping approach” where the deciding 
factor in admitting a statement is whether the declarant was reacting to 
a stressful situation.161  This approach to admitting hearsay is alarming 
because the declarant could despise the defendant and lie simply to 
have the defendant arrested and charged with a crime.162  For example, 
a woman could call the police screaming and crying that her ex-
husband hit her when she actually lied in hopes that she would get full 
custody of their children.  Suppose the woman later recants her 
statement and refuses to sign a supporting deposition.  A police officer 
or an ADA could still use the statement as an excited utterance163 in 
order to prosecute the husband for assault.  Nonetheless, courts do not 
 
156 Lofus, supra note 142, at 518-37 (1993) (describing an experiment in which “children 
aged four to seven years were led to believe that they saw a man hit a girl, when he had not, 
after hearing the girl lie about the assault.  Not only did they misrecall the nonexistent hitting, 
but they added their own details . . . .”). 
157 See Wagoner, supra note 153, at 562.  
158 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 181. 
159 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 181. 
160 A declarant is “the person who made the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(b); see People 
v. Fratello, 706 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (N.Y. 1998). 
161 Steven Zeidman, Who Needs an Evidence Code?: The New York Court of Appeals’ 
Radical Reevaluation of Hearsay, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 211, 220 (1999). 
162 See Holland, supra note 122, at 182. 
163 The statement would qualify as an excited utterance because it was made after a startling 
event and the woman was under stress when she spoke. See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341.  
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take bias into consideration in choosing whether to admit the 
statement.164 
In People v. Lopez,165 a woman who was beaten in her 
apartment made statements to police, which were admitted into 
evidence at trial as hearsay exceptions.166  The court chose to admit the 
statements because “[t]he surrounding circumstances establish that 
they were made ‘under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of 
the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-
interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned 
reflection.’”167  The problem with the court’s “trauma-trumping 
approach” is that it weighs the essence of the terrible ordeal more 
heavily than any other factor, if it even considers any other factors.168  
Therefore, through the court’s eyes, as long as the declarant was 
reacting to a stressful circumstance, other factors, such as a motive to 
lie, may not even be taken into consideration.169  In People v. 
Simpson,170 a woman was accosted by the defendant, who stole her 
engagement ring and allegedly sexually assaulted her in an alley.171  
The woman told the defendant that she would give him money to stop 
bothering her.172  As the two were walking back to her apartment to 
get the money, she yelled out to two friends for help and the defendant 
began to flee.173  She and her friends started to chase the man, but then 
she went back to her apartment to call 911.174  She told the police that 
the man had a gun even though he actually only had a box cutter.175  
She admitted that she lied because she thought it would make the 
police come faster.176  Nevertheless, the court admitted the recording 
of the 911 call into evidence as an excited utterance.177   
The court reasoned that the content of the call showed that the 
woman was still under the stress of the event, which made the tape 
 
164 See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176. 
165 728 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2001). 
166 Id. at 146. 
167 Id. (quoting Brown, 517 N.E.2d at 515). 
168 Zeidman, supra note 161, at 220. 
169 Holland, supra note 122, at 177. 
170 656 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997). 
171 Id. at 766. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
175 Id. at 766-67. 
176 Id. at 767. 
177 Id. 
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admissible despite the self-confessed lie.178  The majority 
acknowledged, but disregarded the fact that “an excited utterance must 
lack the reflective capacity essential for fabrication.”179  The entire 
theory behind the excited utterance doctrine is that the statement was 
made spontaneously without “studied reflection,” which could 
motivate the declarant to lie.180  The court clearly erred in admitting 
the tape as an excited utterance because the declarant, by confessing 
her lie, demonstrated that she had enough time to reflect upon the 
incident to craft a lie.181  The majority simply ignored the lie, which 
undermines the definition of an excited utterance.182  This reasoning 
clearly demonstrates why excited utterances should never be used in 
accusatory instruments; someone could blatantly lie about an incident, 
yet a defendant could and would likely be prosecuted based solely on 
that false statement.  
In People v. Fratello,183 Guy Peduto was shot during a 2:00 
a.m. high-speed car chase in the Bronx.184  Peduto told a passerby and 
an officer that the defendant was the person who shot him.185  Those 
statements were admitted into evidence as excited utterances.186  
Peduto later recanted those statements in an affidavit and was called as 
a witness for the defense at trial.187  On the stand, Peduto explained his 
long-standing friendship with the defendant.188  He also described in 
detail the man who actually shot him.189  Peduto originally lied because 
he was biased against the defendant and feared retaliation for an 
unrelated incident.190  The court admitted the statements despite the 
bias because it concluded that the bias merely serves “as a basis for 
impeachment of the declaration.”191  The problem with the court’s 
reasoning is that, unlike in this case, a hearsay declarant might not 
 
178 Id. 
179 Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Joy, J., dissenting). 
180 Edwards, 392 N.E.2d at 1231. 
181 See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (concluding that a key factor in admitting an excited 
utterance is that there must not have been time for reflection or fabrication). 
182 Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 767. 
183 706 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1998). 




188 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1175. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1176. 
191 Id. 
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testify.192  In order to impeach a witness, a lawyer must ask the witness 
a series of questions to lay the foundation for the contradiction.193  If 
the declarant does not take the stand, it would be impossible to lay the 
foundation for impeachment.194  Thus, it is irrelevant to the court 
whether the declarant had a motive to lie to frame someone for a crime 
he did not commit.195   
The defense argued that the excited utterances should not have 
been admitted into evidence for two reasons.196  First, in order for an 
excited utterance to be admitted, the declarant must have been able to 
observe what he claimed happened.197  The defense argued that Peduto 
could not have possibly recognized the defendant as his attacker during 
the nighttime high-speed chase, and the court erred in refusing to allow 
expert testimony on the issue.198  Second, the defense argued, “the 
prosecution’s entire case was based upon Peduto’s spontaneous 
declarations,” even though his testimony at trial completely 
contradicted those statements.199  If all the evidence in a case comes 
from one witness whose testimony is both inculpating and exculpating, 
the jury can only decide the case based on impermissible speculation, 
which would require the court to dismiss the charges.200  The court, 
however, rejected the per se dismissal rule and decided that a jury 
should be allowed to draw whatever permissible inferences it so 
chooses, as the jurors have a rational basis for resolving the conflicting 
testimony.201  The dissent opined that a repudiated statement should 
not be “used as the sole basis for a conviction.”202  In this case, there 
needed to be some corroborating evidence in order “to find the 
 
192 See Lopez, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 145. 
193 People v. Wise, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (N.Y. 1978) (“To set the stage for the prior 
inconsistency, the questioner must first inform the witness of the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement, and inquire of him whether he in fact made it.”). 
194 Sloan v. N. Y. Cen. R. R. Co., 45 N.Y. 125, 127 (1871) (“To lay the foundation for 
contradiction, it is necessary to ask the witness specifically whether he has made such 
statements.”). 
195 Contra People v. Norton, 563 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (“[I]t is 
vitally important to consider whether [declarant] had, in addition to an opportunity to reflect, 
a reason to fabricate a story implicating defendant.”). 
196 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176. 
197 Id. at 1175. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 1176. 
200 Id. at 1177. 
201 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1177. 
202 Id. at 1179 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
20
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”203  The judge had no 
basis to conclude that the defendant was guilty based on the 
contradictory testimony of only one witness.204   
Fratello exemplifies how dangerous admitting an excited 
utterance can be.  In this case, the excited utterance was the only 
evidence against the defendant even though the hearsay declarant’s 
testimony lacked any credibility.205  This case shows that one can lie, 
admit to lying, and even explain his motive for lying, but the court 
would still admit the original fabricated statement simply because the 
declarant was under stress when he spoke.206  This case should have 
been dismissed;207 it would be impossible to find someone guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt if the sole form of evidence stems from an 
undependable and contradictory hearsay declarant.208   
Simpson and Fratello have proven that the credibility of the 
declarant is not taken into consideration when admitting a hearsay 
exception into evidence.209  Sometimes these statements are the only 
form of evidence in the prosecution’s case.210  Prosecutors weigh the 
strengths and weaknesses of their cases and offer plea deals 
accordingly.211  However, prosecutors may be less inclined to enter 
into plea discussions or dismiss a case because they know that the 
 
203 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Holland, supra note 122, at 182 (warning that without 
any other corroborating evidence, such as physical injury, a statement may be admitted 
“simply because the complainant said it,” and that statement could serve as the only form of 
evidence against the defendant). 
204 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1179 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Jackson, 480 
N.E.2d 727, 732 (N.Y. 1985)); see also People v. Stewart, 358 N.E.2d 487, 492-93 (N.Y. 
1976) (“Here all the evidence on this point came from a single prosecution witness who offered 
irreconcilable testimony pointing in both directions to guilt and innocence on the homicide 
charge.  There was then no basis for the jury to find that the injury inflicted by the defendant 
caused the death of Daniel Smith, beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
205 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176. 
206 Id. at 1174-76. 
207 See Norton, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (holding excited utterances 
cannot be admitted where a declarant “clearly had a motive—revenge—to fabricate his initial 
statements”). 
208 See Jackson, 480 N.E.2d at 732 (“When all of the evidence of guilt comes from a single 
prosecution witness who gives irreconcilable testimony pointing both to guilt and innocence, 
the jury is left without basis, other than impermissible speculation, for its determination of 
either.”); see also Norton, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (“There is a significant probability that the 
jury would have made a different finding but for the erroneous admission of the hearsay 
testimony.”). 
209 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176; Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 767.  
210 See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176. 
211 Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 121, at 124. 
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witness’s credibility will not affect their case.212  Because the District 
Attorney’s office does not have to factor the witness’s credibility into 
account, ADAs do not have to screen out these weaker cases.213  This 
could result in a heavy court calendar full of baseless prosecutions.214  
Thus, hearsay statements should have to be proven as reliable and 
credible because once they are admitted, they will not only burden the 
court’s time, but could also deprive a defendant of his or her 
freedom.215    
IV. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Hearsay evidence arguably violates an accused’s right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him”216 because the hearsay 
declarant will never be subject to cross-examination.217  In Crawford 
v. Washington,218 the Supreme Court held that extrajudicial statements, 
which are testimonial in nature, are barred under the Confrontation 
Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.219  The Court relied on 
long-standing precedent, which held that ex parte depositions and 
affidavits presented at trial deprive the accused of his constitutional 
right to confront his accuser face-to-face.220   
Federal Rule of Evidence 803,221 however, disregards the 
unavailability requirement that has been outlined by the Supreme 
 
212 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 121, at 124. 
213 See Holland, supra note 122, at 179-80. 
214 See discussion supra Section III. 
215 See discussion supra Section III. 
216 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  New York’s Constitution has an identical provision stating 
“[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend 
in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 
6.  See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“The right to confront one’s 
accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times.”).   
217 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (“The main and essential purpose of 
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.”). 
218 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
219 Id. at 53-54, 68 (reasoning that the Framers must have based the Sixth Amendment on 
English common law, which “conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on 
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine”).  
220 Id. at 57 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 
(1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)). 
221 FED. R. EVID. 803. 
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Court for hearsay declarants.222  As previously stated, hearsay 
exceptions stem from necessity.223  Thus, when there is an available 
complaining witness, it is not necessary for a police officer or an ADA 
to sign a supporting deposition justified by hearsay exceptions.224  The 
complainants in Solomon, Swinger, Foster, and Rasoully were not 
unavailable, but simply chose not to sign supporting depositions.225  
Allowing unnecessary hearsay exceptions in an accusatory instrument 
implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
available witnesses against him.226   
Although this constitutional protection generally applies 
during a trial, the Confrontation Clause should extend to the pleading 
stage because an accusatory instrument is the sole document needed to 
prosecute someone for a misdemeanor.227  Approximately ninety-four 
percent of misdemeanor cases are disposed of via plea-bargaining; 
therefore, there is a strong chance the case may never go to trial.228  
Even if the case does go to trial, the defendant will not be able to 
confront his accuser face-to-face.229  Instead, he will only be able to 
confront a police officer or an ADA, who will simply reiterate hearsay 
declarations because neither of them actually witnessed the incident.230  
 
222 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; California, 399 U.S. at 186 (“What I would hold binding on 
the States as a matter of due process is what I also deem the correct meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause—that a State may not in a criminal case use hearsay when 
the declarant is available.”). 
223 Barber, 390 U.S. at 722; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“The Confrontation 
Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay.  First, in 
conformance with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment 
establishes a rule of necessity.  In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-
examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the 
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.”). 
224 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (“If the declarant is available and 
the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with 
full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little 
justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are 
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation 
Clause analysis, favor the better evidence.”); see Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 374 (“If such an 
eyewitness is available to testify to the events, there is certainly no pressing need for the 
hearsay testimony.”). 
225 See discussion supra Section I. 
226 See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra notes 65, 68 and accompanying text. 
228 Goode, supra note 35. 
229 See Lopez, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46 (stating that the complainant did not testify at trial, 
but her “statements in the apartment to a police officer were admitted over defendant’s hearsay 
objection”). 
230 See id. 
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Thus, a police officer or an ADA should not be allowed to sign a 
supporting deposition in lieu of the actual complaining witness’s 
supporting deposition because the Supreme Court has established that 
hearsay exceptions should only be used when necessary, meaning the 
declarant must be unavailable.231 
V. SOLUTIONS 
A.  Advice for Defense Attorneys 
When hearsay exceptions are used in accusatory instruments, 
defense attorneys must address it or the objection will be waived.232  In 
order to preserve the issue for appeal, defense attorneys must write a 
motion to dismiss based on facial insufficiency or object to the 
pleading defect on the record at the next relevant court date.233  The 
facial insufficiency motion should attack each element of the crime 
charged.  Defense attorneys should argue that each element of the 
crime has not been established by non-hearsay, factual allegations as 
required by the CPL.234  In addition, the hearsay exceptions themselves 
should be attacked as not rising to the level of an excited utterance or 
a present sense impression.235  
B.  Guidance for the Court 
If the court deems it necessary to admit hearsay exceptions in 
accusatory instruments, certain safeguards should be in place.  First, in 
order to admit an exited utterance, there should be some form of 
corroborating evidence to ensure the statement is valid.236  
Corroborating evidence will protect defendants from hearsay 
declarants who are not credible, or declarants who are plainly lying 
 
231 See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text. 
232 Casey, 740 N.E.2d at 241 (“[H]earsay pleading defects in the factual portion of a local 
criminal court information must be preserved in order to be reviewable as a matter of law on 
appeal.  Because defendant failed to interpose a timely objection or motion before the trial 
court which addressed the hearsay defect in the misdemeanor information in this case, we are 
precluded from considering it.”). 
233 Id. 
234 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972). 
235 See discussion supra Section III. 
236 See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1179-80 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that corroborating 
evidence should be required for excited utterances just as it is required for present sense 
impressions). 
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about the incident, because it will provide independent evidence aside 
from the statement itself.237  Second, hearsay exceptions should be 
admitted if the defendant is truly unavailable, not merely choosing to 
recant his or her statement.238  Third, New York should implement a 
rule pertaining to the impeachment of a non-testifying hearsay 
declarant because it would safeguard the defendant against a biased 
declarant as well as provide Confrontation Clause protection.239  New 
York courts should allow the testimony of rebuttal witnesses who can 
impeach a hearsay declarant by prior inconsistent statements.240    
VI. CONCLUSION 
New York trial courts have begun a trend of holding accusatory 
instruments facially sufficient, without a complainant’s supporting 
deposition.241  Those accusatory instruments contained depositions of 
officers and ADAs using hearsay exceptions, such as excited 
utterances and present sense impressions, to relay statements made to 
them by the true complainants.242  This trend needs to end and should 
not be permitted for several reasons.   
First, permitting the use of hearsay in an accusatory instrument 
violates the rule against hearsay stated in the CPL.243  Second, the 
declarant may be biased or not credible.244  Third, permitting hearsay 
exceptions in accusatory instruments arguably violates a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.245  Lastly and most 
 
237 See id.; see also supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
238 See discussion supra Section IV. 
239 See FED. R. EVID. 806 (“When a hearsay statement—or a statement described in Rule 
801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)––has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be 
attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if 
the declarant had testified as a witness.  The court may admit evidence of the declarant’s 
inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had 
an opportunity to explain or deny it.  If the party against whom the statement was admitted 
calls the declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on the statement as if on 
cross-examination.”); see also People v. Devalle, 670 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
1998) (admitting “a prior inconsistent statement to impeach” a non-testifying hearsay 
declarant and holding “‘if there was never any opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the 
inconsistent statement may be shown without a foundation.’”). 
240 Id. 
241 See discussion supra Section I. 
242 See discussion supra Section I. 
243 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35(1)(a) (McKinney 1972). 
244 See discussion supra Section III. 
245 See discussion supra Section IV. 
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importantly, without any other safeguards, a defendant may be 
prosecuted and deprived of liberty based solely on a hearsay statement, 
which may not be accurate or reliable.246   
In order to preserve this issue for appeal, defense attorneys 
must address the pleading defect in a motion or on the record in 
court.247  To minimize the unreliability of hearsay exceptions, New 
York courts should require corroborating evidence and should permit 
hearsay declarants to be impeached by prior inconsistent statements.248  
In conclusion, hearsay exceptions should not be permitted in 
accusatory instruments as the sole form of evidence against a 
defendant because it violates the CPL and unfairly prejudices a 
defendant in that he or she may be prosecuted based solely on hearsay 
exceptions, instead of concrete facts.249 
 
 
246 See discussion supra Section III. 
247 See discussion supra Section V. 
248 See discussion supra Section V. 
249 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
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